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mAbstract
In this paper we attempted to chart the impact of the early part of Ireland’s
economic crisis from 2008–2009 on the distribution of income. In order to decompose
the impact of changes in different income components, we utilised a microsimulation
methodology and the EU-SILC User Database. This simulation based methodology
involved the disaggregation of the 6 main benefit variables in the EU-SILC into 17
variables for our tax-benefit model. Validating, our results were positive, giving us
confidence in our methodology. We utilised the framework to model changes in
the level of income inequality from the period just before the crisis in 2004 to the
depth of the worst year of the crisis in 2009. In terms of the impact of the economic
crisis, we found that income inequality fell in the early part of the crisis modelled
in this paper. Much of this change was due to rising inequality of market incomes,
(even when discounting unemployment). This was due to the differential effect of
the downturn on different sectors where some sectors such as the construction
and public sectors were significantly hit, while the international traded sectors have
been relatively immune from the downturn and have seen continued growth. The
impact of the tax-benefit system has been to mitigate this upward pressure, with a
gradual rise in the redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system driven by an increase in
demand on the benefits side and increased progressivity on the tax side.
Jel codes: H22, H55, C15
Keywords: Economic crisis, Inequality, Microsimulation modelling1. Introduction
Ireland’s economic crisis is well documented. During a very high growth period, the
GDP per capita of the country grew from below the EU15 average in 1997 to a high
point of 148% in 2007.1 Ireland subsequently entered a severe economic decline in late
2007. The annual period up to quarter 4 2009 (the lowest quarter) witnessed a fall in
GDP (in constant prices), a measure of national output, of 11.5% from its peak in quarter
4 2007 (the peak). The fall in GNP, a measure of national income, was even greater
with a 15.6% fall from peak in quarter 4 2007 to its floor in quarter 1, 2011. At this
point real GDP was equivalent to the value in quarter 4 2005.
Whelan (2010) discusses some of the reasons and implications of the economic
crisis. Firstly as a small open economy, it was inevitable that Ireland would be
significantly affected by the global economic and financial crisis. The construction
related boom that characterised the last years of the boom period saw the share of
the workforce working in construction reach an unsustainable 13.3% of the workO'Donoghue et al.; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
2013
O’Donoghue et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 2 of 262013, 2:23
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/23force in 2007, fully 5 percentage points higher than most other EU countries. While
the full extent of the crisis was largely unforeseen, there existed a number of
conditions for a slowdown in growth numbers. For instance, by 2007 the demographic
changes were no longer contributing to economic growth as the size of the labour force
peaked. Productivity growth had also slowed.
The period of economic growth also witnessed changes in the composition of fiscal
policy from income taxes to property capital gains taxes and VAT, which were largely
related to the property boom. The ending of the property bubble saw construction
employment decline from 270,000 in early 2007 to 126,000 at the end of 2009 and
government tax revenues plummeted by nearly 18% from the resultant unemployment as
well as the loss of tax revenues associated with construction, while public expenditure
on transfers increased from €18.7 billion in 2007 to €23.5 billion in 2009. The collapse
of the property bubble left most of the Irish banks in precarious positions as a result of
collateral collapsing due to the fall in property values in the region of 40%, resulting
in the state stepping in to guarantee the banks.
O’Riain (2012) used insights from economic sociology to further explore this financial
aspect of the crisis and identifies the reduction in the capital gains tax rate from 40 to
20 per cent in 1998 as a catalyst for the rapid growth in property investment. The share
of total credit going to construction and real estate rose steadily from 7% in 2000 to
17% in 2004 and 28% in 2007, the increase in the final three years of the boom being
largely due to loans to property developers, a point also made by Whelan. The share of
corporate profits due to the banking sector increased from approximately 8% in 2000 to
13% in 2007 in a similar fashion to the trend in the United Kingdom. By contrast, in
France and Germany where the impact of recession was much less severe, the share of
bank profits changed little during the boom although banks in both countries became
much more reliant upon international lending during this time.
The economic crisis manifested itself in changes both to the labour market, wages,
prices including housing costs and public policy changes to tax, transfer and public
sector pay costs. Each of these changes have quite heterogeneous impacts on the
population and it is difficult to understand a priori who is impacted most by these
changes. It is quite important therefore from a public perspective to understand the
distributional impacts of these changes.
The impact of the decline in the labour market can be felt in the household sector in
a number of dimensions. Public sector wages have been reduced via a number of policy
changes which Callan and Nolan (2010) found to be progressive. Callan and Nolan
(2010) examined the tax increases and welfare rate reductions between 2009 and 2010,
again finding these policy changes to be progressive. As the crisis progressed, combined
with increases in mortgage interest rates, households with high mortgages have faced
pressures in meeting payments. McCarthy and McQuinn (2010) have considered the
distributional characteristics of the ratio of mortgage interest to income ratio, finding
quite significant heterogeneity. Counterbalancing falls in income 2009 and 2010 saw
falls in the CPI with differential changes across commodity groups. Loughrey and
O’Donoghue (2012) examined the distributional impact of these price changes.
Callan et al (2010b) utilised the EU-SILC to understand changes in inequality over
time around the crisis. However comparing the income distribution of one year with
another using micro-data may have a confounding effect of labour market and population
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came many of these obstacles in examining employee wage inequality during the boom by
employing the decomposition technique of Machado and Matta (2005). This allowed the
authors to distinguish between the impact on dispersion of changes in wage returns versus
changes in workforce composition but excluded policy changes. The overall findings from
that work are that the dispersion of hourly wages fell sharply from 1994 to 2000 as
the returns to education declined but subsequently increased though much less
sharply to 2007.
These kinds of microsimulation analysis are a particularly useful methodology for
counter-factual simulation, which can help to explain the functioning of the tax-benefit
system relative to alternatives. To decompose this effect, we would like to compare the
counter factual effect of differences due to tax-benefit changes alone. Microsimulation
modelling is a simulation based method using micro-data that is typically used to assess
the impact of policy changes. In Ireland, the SWITCH model (Callan et al., 1994) has
been used for 20 years to assess the impact of policy change on inequality (Callan et al.,
2001). Callan et al. (2010) utilise a special version of the EU-SILC dataset available for Ireland
for 2008. Callan et al. (2012, 2011) have been used to assess the impact of budgetary
policy relative to a base population in 2008 adjusted for population and labour market
change using reweighting and updating.
In this paper we would like to understand changes in the distribution of income
over the period of the EU-SILC 2004–2009, tracking the period before and after the
crisis to the year with the greatest decline. In particular we would like to assess the
distributional impact of individual policy changes. Given a number of challenges associated
with the EU-SILC (Figari et al., 2007), we have developed a microsimulation model of the
Irish tax-benefit system for each year to understand the impact of individual taxes and ben-
efits to help decompose this impact. In particular, the paper proposes a method to overcome
some of the challenges in using the harmonised EU-SILC for microsimulation modelling.
Section 2 describes the tax-benefit microsimulation methodology used in this paper.
Section 3 describes the data requirements of utilising the EU-SILC for microsimulation
modelling. In Section 4, we describe the methodologies utilised for the imputation of
disaggregated benefits. In Section 5, we describe the welfare impact of labour market
changes over the period 2005–2009. Section 6 concludes.2. Methodology – tax benefit microsimulation
Methodologically, the focus in this paper is in understanding the way in which the Irish
tax-benefit system has changed over time. In this section, we describe the data requirements
for modelling the system.
Changes in income inequality depend not only upon changes in market income, but also
changes in tax-benefit policy. The Irish tax-benefit system falls within the Anglo-liberal
category of welfare states, social transfers have primarily a poverty reduction focus based
around flat rate insurance benefits, or means tested benefits.2
There are no earnings related components of the benefit system. The income taxation
has a schedule with two rates and has an optional joint filing system with partial transfer
of bands and credits. The 2000’s have seen a move away from allowances to credits
payable at the standard rate. Social insurance contributions are flat rate with a floor and
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the tax-payer base over time, with 34% tax-payers exempt in 2005 and 40% in 2007.
Disposable income, defined as income after direct taxation and social benefits is
calculated through the use of a static tax-benefit microsimulation model, programmed in
Stata. The model simulates the main direct tax and transfer instruments
 Income Taxation
 Social Insurance Contributions (Employee, Self-Employed and Employer)
 Income and Pension Levies
 Family Benefits
 Social Assistance Benefits
 Social Insurance Benefits
Using the tax-benefit model only the level of payment of social insurance benefits
are modelled, with eligibility being assumed to depend upon receipt in the data,
within this paper. The tax-benefit system is stylised, focusing on the main instruments,
but ignoring some tax-credits and housing related benefits. As is normal in analyses of this
kind, we do not consider in this analysis the impact of other tax and public expenditure
changes. Over the period of this analysis, the share of indirect taxation rose, although this
was as much due to a declining rate of income taxation as a result of falling incomes, as
changes in tax rules. This effect is likely to be regressive (Decoster et al., 2010). In parallel
there have been reductions in public expenditure that are more difficult to quantify.
However Callan and Keane (2009) made an attempt to quantify the distributional impact
of some public services and Callan and Nolan (2010) attempt to quantify the distributional
dimension of public expenditure cuts that related to public sector pay cuts.
In Figure 1, we describe the functioning of the tax-benefit system, simulating this system
in 2005 for a hypothetical family of a single earner married couple with two children. The
simulations are based upon the tax-benefit microsimulation model used in this paper. The-15000
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Figure 1 Budget constraint diagram for 2005 tax-benefit system (with detailed decomposition of
disposable income). Note: We assume here a single earner married couple with 2 children, aged X and Y,
with no direct housing costs for simplification. The main earner has a wage rate of two thirds the
average wage.
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hour, with hours varying from 0 hours (and seeking work) through to 80 hours per week.
In this figure, we describe the different components of disposable income, which is
equivalent to the top of the graphic. Disposable income is comprised of net market
income, equal to gross market income minus income taxation, social insurance contribu-
tions and income levies. Unemployment assistance is paid at zero hours and gradually
tapered away with a 60% withdrawal rate up until 20 hours per week is worked. Once
this 20 hour limit is reached a family income supplement (FIS), an in-work cash benefit
for low income families, is paid. Child related benefits, including child benefits and
from 2006 a child care subsidy for young children are also included.
In Figure 2, we report trends in the overall budget constraint over the period of
respectively 2003–2007, the period up to the crash and for 2007 to 2012, the period
after the crash. These budget constraints reflect the disposable income associated(a) 2003-2007
(b) 2007-2013
Figure 2 Budget Constraint Diagram for tax-benefit systems. Note: 1. We assume here a single earner
married couple with 2 children, aged X and Y, with no direct housing costs for simplification. The main
earner has a wage rate of two thirds the average wage. 2. The budget constraints have deflated by CPI to
reflect purchasing power. Wages have been assumed to grow in line with average wage growth. 3. The
ages of children used in the hypotethical family are 1 and 6. yyABCD – reflects the budget constraint for
year ABCD (a and b).
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changes to purchasing power. Wages are assumed to grow at the average rate for
industrial employees.
The main changes to the structure of the tax-benefit system have been outlined in
Appendix 1. Most changes have been parametric, with some structural changes to “income
levies” or additional taxes, social insurance contributions the introduction and abolition of
a childcare supplement. Some of the changes applied to part years. In order to incorporate
this, looking at annual incomes, we apply a proportion of each set of policy parameters to
the appropriate number of months.
In the period to 2007, we notice that the overall budget constraint flattens, with the
ratio of disposable income for 40 hours to 0 hours decreasing from 1.70 in 2003 to 1.45
in 2007. It also continues to fall to 1.39 in 2009, before rising again. The period to 2007
sees a steady rise in the level of the budget constraint as the purchasing power for all
parts of the budget constraint rose as wage and benefit growth outstripped inflation.
In 2008, the budget declined slightly at the top. In 2009, the purchasing power of the
bottom of the distribution rose slightly, but fell at the top, with the reverse occurring
in 2010. In 2011, purchasing power fell for most groups, with the bottom falling
slightly more. Purchasing power continued to fall across all income levels in 2012.
However in 2013 the system becomes more regressive, with purchasing power rising
at the top. This rests upon our assumption that earnings will grow at the same rate as
the previous year, the same assumption that is made for the CPI.
In Figure 3, we consider some of the components that drive these changes, reporting
changes in the values of sectoral wage rates, CPI, tax credits and benefit levels. It is
by necessity only a snap shot of a number of the changing parameters. To consider
the impact of changes against purchasing power, we focus first on CPI, which rose to
2008, but then Ireland experienced deflation to 2010, before prices rose again to
2012. Working age unemployment benefits have risen the most relative to CPI, even
with a nominal cut in 2009 and 2010.3 Old age benefits incurred no nominal cut, by the90
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Figure 3 Growth Rate of Components of the Tax-Benefit System relative to Prices and Incomes.
Note: UA – Unemployment Benefit rate. UA Single – Unemployment Assistance for Single Person. Old Age
Single – Contributory State Old Age Pension for Single Person. CPI – Consumer Price Index. Industry –
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rose at a rate close to CPI, but then nominal cuts relative to rising CPI saw the index
dip below CPI and thus leading to fiscal drag. Of the 4 sectors considered, the financial
sector, given the banking collapse has seen the largest fall relative to CPI, with the
industrial, largely export based sector having wage growth exceeding CPI.Data requirements
In order to simulate taxes or benefits, we require data with the following characteristics
 A dataset representative of the household population with appropriate weights,
with sufficient sample size for sub-groups to undertake disaggregated analysis
 Data that has incomes before the application of incomes (gross incomes)
 The period of analysis may vary from instrument to instrument too, with income
taxes typically assessed over a year (which may or may not align with the calendar
year), while some benefits may have a period of analysis of a month. Sometimes the
period of analysis for payment of a benefit (current month), may differ from the
period of analysis of the means for assessment (e.g. previous year). However very
few datasets allow for such heterogeneity.3. Data
Understanding the impact of changes in labour market, incomes and policy measures
required data with sufficient detail. SILC is a dataset that has been collected in Ireland
since 2003 and is the successor to the earlier European Community Household Panel
Survey. The SILC dataset collects information on incomes, labour market characteristics,
demographics and living conditions and is used to undertake analyses on poverty, inequality
and deprivation. We utilise data for 2004 to 2009. While data was released by Eurostat
for 2010, errors were found in the data and by the time of going to print revised data
had not been made available.4
The EU-SILC is collected at the national level, with harmonised version supplied to
Eurostat, which is then processed and provided to researchers as a harmonised User
Database (UDB). We utilise the Irish component of the EU-SILC (UDB) in which to
model the income distribution. Data are provided gross of taxes and contributions. The
Irish component uses partially survey and partially register data. 80% of respondents
allowed their national social security number to be used to access administrative data
in relation to their benefit entitlement (Callan et al., 2010).
A national weighting methodology is utilised incorporating constraints based upon
(sex, age-group, region, household composition) based upon a combination of population
projections based on the Census and from the Quarterly National Household Survey
(Callan et al., 2010). It should be noted however that although the weights are repre-
sentative of the population structure, they are not fully representative of either the social
transfer recipients, of the taxable income distribution, nor of the representativity of
the top of the distribution. Callan et al., (2010) proposed a reweighting methodology
based upon external data to improve the representativity in this dimensions. In a survey
of microsimulation models across the world, O’Donoghue and Loughrey (2013) found
that about 50% of models reweighted their data to account for issues such as this. In
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may well indeed improve the accuracy of the ‘true’ distribution of income in a country, it
would differ from official definitions utilising the statistical office supplied weights.
As a result and because the purpose of this paper is to understand the difference
using the EU-SILC definition of income and associated weights, we do not make this
adjustment here.
There are however a number of challenges to utilising the EU-SILC for microsimulation
modelling.
Given the availability of parental and partner ID variables, it is possible to generate
most (within household) units of analysis required by a tax-benefit system. However
the data is not sufficient, where instruments require knowledge about inter-household
units of analysis, say for higher education grants.
A challenge in the use of the EU-SILC rests in the difference between the period of
analysis for the income variables, which typically are the previous year and the personal
characteristics which typically relate to the time of interview. Thus one may observe
people made unemployed in the interview year but with employment income in the
data. Thus there may be inconsistencies between both. Ireland has a slightly different
definition as the reference period spans two tax years as the “income reference period”
is “12 month prior the date of interview”, the end of income reference period is the
date of the interview. Approximately 25% of the sample is collected in each quarter.
As both tax-benefit models and the EU-SILC, aim to measure household disposable,
income, by and large, the EU-SILC has the appropriate variables required for tax-benefit
modelling. However there are a number of issues. Firstly there are some missing variables
such as capital gains and wealth or property values. However this is typical of most
income surveys and so most tax-benefit microsimulation models make look at a definition
of disposable income that does not incorporate taxes based upon these measures. It would
be reasonable therefore for an EU-SILC based model to make a similar assumption.
A particular challenge to microsimulation modelling is that some of the variables
are not easily attributable to the appropriate unit of analysis. For example some of
the income variables that are received by individual such as capital income, rental
income, private transfers, young person’s income, are only recorded at the household
level. Thus in practice these variables will be assigned to the head of household,
which in a progressive tax system, may over-estimate the amount of taxation if some
of these incomes were incident on others in the household. This is also the case
with family benefits which may be incident at the nuclear family level but are only
recorded at the household level. Where these instruments are taxable, this too may
bias the results.
One of the most serious challenges to using the EU-SILC for microsimulation modelling
is the aggregation of benefits. Within the EU-SILC, social benefits are aggregated into
6 benefits recorded at the individual level (unemployment, old-age, survivor, sickness,
disability and education) plus 3 recorded at the household level (family, social exclusion,
housing benefits). If it were possible, utilising other data to model all benefits, then
this aggregation would not be an issue, as we could replace the data recorded benefits
with the simulated benefits. However, while in practice we model most benefits in
Ireland as there are no earnings related benefits, we model the value for most benefits.
The Irish social science data archive makes available a variant of the SILC for Ireland
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microsimulation modelling as incomes are aggregated to the household level and
some variables such as age have been banded.
As we do not know the contributory conditions used for social insurance benefits, we
would like to utilise benefit receipt to model the level of these benefits. For most social
assistance and family benefits, we have sufficient information to model the benefit.
Callan et al., (2010) have access to a special research version of the 2008 EU-SILC
which does not suffer from these aggregation issues.
It should be noted however that even where we can fully model an instrument, because
of benefit take-up issues, we would still like to know the value and presence of the benefit
so that take-up can be modelled; although many models assume 100% take-up.
A similar issue to benefit take-up is the use of survey data to make inferences about
mis-calculation of taxes and social insurance contributions. Ideally therefore taxes
and social contributions would be available separately at the most appropriate unit of
analysis. However within the EU-SILC, they are reported at an aggregated level in terms
of the instruments being reported in a single variable and at an aggregate level in terms of
being reported at the household level. However this is not a major issue as many income
datasets do not have separate income tax and social insurance contribution data.
In general the EU-SILC has a relatively good availability of appropriate expenditures
used in the tax and benefit system, particularly containing mortgage interest, private
pension contributions and other housing costs. However in common with other income
surveys, there is missing information on other deductible expenditures including medical
insurance etc. The survey also does not contain the value of the residential property,
which from 2013 is required in Ireland to model a local property tax.4. Statistical model: benefit disaggregation and property value estimation
As identified in the last section, there are a number of barriers to utilising the EU-SILC
for microsimulation purposes. A challenge in this paper is to impute disaggregated benefit
entitlement. Figari et al. (2007) describe a methodology developed by Levy and Mercader
(2003) for disaggregating benefits in the Spanish EU-SILC. They required splitting:
 Unemployment benefits into 2 disaggregated benefits
 Old Age Benefits into 3 disaggregated benefits
 Survivor’s Benefits into 2 disaggregated benefits
Unemployment benefits in Spain can be split relatively easily as insurance benefits
cannot fall below 75% of the minimum wage and assistance benefits are equal to 75%
of the minimum wage (although income tested, they are not means tested). Old age
benefits, except for an old age supplement that is income contingent, are relatively
straightforward to disentangle as they do not overlap in terms of value. Survivor’s Benefits
are imputed in a similar way. Child Benefits can more or less be modelled on the basis of
information in the data.
However the Irish case is (as is likely the case in many northern European countries)
more complicated. This is due to the fact that there are more instruments (See Appendix
1) with more complicated rules and with overlapping values between instruments.
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In order to impute the value of these benefits at a disaggregated level, we need to
understand the characteristics associated with the receipt of each benefit and then to
simulate, given the receipt of an aggregated benefit group, the value of a benefit at
each level.
Conditional on receipt of an aggregate benefit in the data, we utilise the following
equations to simulate the disaggregated benefits. The first objective therefore is to estimate
a series of statistical models relating entitlement to a disaggregated benefit as a function
of the aggregate benefit. To disaggregate these variables into their benefit components,
we utilise the fact that an earlier survey, the Living in Ireland Survey (LII) 1994–2001
contains disaggregated benefits. We estimate equations of benefit entitlement in the
LII and use these estimates to simulate entitlement to disaggregated benefits in the SILC
data. It is in effect a parametric statistical matching method. We based this relationship
on demographic characteristics, existence of other incomes, labour market characteristics
of the recipient and spouse.
Depending upon whether the dependent variable is binary as in the case of survivor’s
benefits or old age benefits or have more than 2 categories as in the case of unemployment
or disability benefits, we utilise respectively a multinomial logit model.
We choose as explanatory variables, characteristics that may be associated with the
type of dependent variable. So for example for unemployment benefits, we would expect
those over 55 to be more likely to claim the pre-retirement allowance. Those with higher
household current market income will more likely to be in receipt of social insurance
benefits. For similar reasons, those with in-work employment status will be more
likely to be in receipt of social insurance. The self-employed are typically not eligible
for social insurance benefits. As benefits give additional payments for dependents,
and thus the taper for a means tested benefit will extend longer for a larger family,
making this makes larger families more likely to be in receipt of a means tested benefit.
By its nature, those in receipt of a back to work allowance are more likely to be in-work
than for the other benefits. Table 1 confirms these results for unemployment benefits.
The pseudo R2 indicates a reasonably good fit.
For survivor’s benefits, the distinction is between means-tested and insurance benefits.
In Table 2, we see as in the case of unemployment benefits that those in receipt of other
incomes are less likely to be in receipt of means tested benefits. However older people
are more likely to be in receipt. The fit of the model is not very good and this gets
progressively worse over time, as by 2009, only about 2% of recipients receive means
tested survivor’s benefits. There is a similar relationship for old age benefits (Table 3).
As only the Old Age (Transitory) Pension, modelled as part of the insurance pension
here, requires one to retire from the labour market, we notice that receipt of the insurance
pension is highly significantly related to being retired. As in the case of survivor’s benefits
(Table 2), share in receipt of means tested benefits has fallen over time.
Again for disability benefit (Table 4) we observe the same pattern in relation to means
tested benefits with higher other income sources reducing the likelihood of receipt.
Unsurprisingly, chronic illness is relatively more important. Carer’s meanwhile are
more likely to be younger and have more children.
The regressions are then utilised to simulate benefits in the SILC, using proportions
with aggregated category consistent with Social Welfare Statistics. The share of individuals
Table 1 Benefit disaggregation equations (unemployment benefits) – multinomial logit
Dependent variable
category
Unemployment means-tested
assistance receipt
Back-to work
allowance receipt
Pre-retirement
allowance receipt
Male 0.898*** 0.088 −0.904
Aged 55+ −0.447 −0.875 3.816
Lose job in last year −0.177 −0.339 0.336
Value of social welfare benefits 0.835*** 2.355*** 0.89
Employment earnings −2.432*** −0.918 −22.142**
Employee 0.37 5.851*** −36.643
Farmer 1.717** 0.988 0.398
Self-employed 2.586* 8.598*** −42.89
Unemployed 0.355 −36.824 −1.375
Spouse in-work 0.23 −1.263* 0.497
Inactive 0.135 −36.009 0.888
Retired −44.891 −40.393 7.074***
Age 0.042 0.088 −0.213
Age squared −0.001 −0.001 0.003
Married −0.274 −0.25 0.842
Widowed 37.636 38.453 −1.628
Separated or divorced −0.455 1.105 1.524
Number of children aged 0-11 0.074 0.646** −2.045
Number of children aged 12-15 0.238 1.017** 0.992
Constant −1.146* −8.792*** −0.751
Pseudo R squared 0.5023
Note: The base case here is not in receipt of benefits.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Table 2 Benefit disaggregation equations (survivor’s benefits)
Dependent variable: Survivors assistance pension receipt
Male −0.42
Value of other benefits 0.143 **
Value of social welfare benefits −4.073 **
Other household income −0.957 **
Employment earnings −3.719 **
Employee 1.114 **
Retired −0.056
Age 0.054 **
Age squared −0.001 **
Number of children aged 0-11 −0.007
Number of children aged 12-15 0.246
Constant 1.742 **
Pseudo R squared 0.108
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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Table 3 Benefit disaggregation equations (old age benefits)
Dependent variable: Old age insurance pension receipt
Male −0.496***
Value of other benefits 0.21***
Value of social welfare benefits −0.971***
Household income −0.422***
Employee −1.145
Retired −1.157***
Age 0.476*
Age squared −0.003*
Married −0.313
Widowed −0.525**
Separated or divorced 0.042
Number of children aged 0-11 0.097
Number of children aged 12-15 0.287
Constant −18.745**
Pseudo R squared 0.1678
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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of recipients for an aggregated benefit that are in receipt of a particular disaggregated
benefit. These proportions are provided below in Figures 4a-4d. Individuals are imputed
as being in receipt of a disaggregated benefit where the estimated probability of receipt
exceeds the threshold specified by the calibration totals.
We note that as the Irish social insurance system matures and as economic change
occurs, the balance between different benefits changes, for example, one can see from
Figure 4b that the share of survivor’s insurance benefits approaches 100% while the
share of survivor’s assistance benefits approaches 100%. In terms of the disability
benefits, Figure 4d shows that the share applying to invalidity insurance increases
around 2006 but subsequently declines as the share for carers benefit recipients
increases. As the economic crisis arose in 2008, the share of those in receipt of short term
unemployment benefits rose, before falling as the share of longer termed unemployed
rose as shown in Figure 4a. We utilise the equations to predict the disaggregation of
highest probability and then rank this variable to select the most likely disaggregated
benefits.
This imputation was evaluated against the actual data and was found not to be
completely precise as a small number of individuals were predicted by these equations
to receive means tested benefits, but had means too high to be eligible.
In order to evaluate this we had to run the tax-benefit system. However as noted above
the Irish component of the EU-SILC has incomes that span two tax years. In order to get
a more accurate measure we ran the tax-benefit system for the data interview year and for
the preceding year, taking a weighted average depending upon the quarter of interview.
In order to correct these problems; individuals who were simulated to receive assistance
benefits but not eligible under the precise rules were given eligibility for contributory
benefits and a corresponding number of those with insurance benefits were given
Table 4 Benefit disaggregation equations (disability benefits) – multinomial Logit
Dependent variables Long-term disability
assistance benefit receipt
Carers allowance/benefit receipt
Male −0.524 −0.688
Lose job in last year −0.055 0.192*
Value of social welfare benefits −0.953** −1.21**
Household income 0.255 0.389
Employment earnings −2.986* 0.422
Employee −0.055 −0.437
Chronic illness 1.307*** −37.911
Retired −2.016* −35.843
Age 0.019 −0.139**
Age squared 0 0.002*
Married −2.331*** 0.041
Widowed 36.067 −1.251
Separated or divorced −2.906** 0.937
Number of children aged 0-11 0.022 0.926***
Number of children aged 12-15 0.077 −0.23
Constant 1.373 1.624
Pseudo R squared 0.3661
Note: The base case is not in receipt of benefits.
* significant at 10%.
** significant at 5%.
*** significant at 1%.
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then used to calculate the value.
Adjustments were also made for some measurement error. For example some individuals
of pension age were classified as being in receipt of working age benefits. In this case
we assume a classification error and transform them to old age benefits. Where working
age people are in receipt of state pensions, we transfer these to occupational pensions.
There are some period effect issues also where multiple income replacement benefit
receipt occurs during a single year. As the data does not contain information on the
number of months of receipt of different benefits, only the total, we make the assumption
that the dominant benefit (i.e. the one with the higher value) is received for 12 months.
The latter assumption is likely to bias upwards benefit receipt as it will overstate the
benefits of those in receipt for less than 12 months.
A further adjustment is also made as the SILC data contains some private sector social
protection instruments such as redundancy payments and some private pensions.
Amounts over and above state social protection instruments, calculated using the
tax-benefit model, are transferred into market income variables.Validation
Before going further, we undertake a validation of simulation of taxes and benefits. We
firstly in Table 5 consider the non take-up rate at the aggregate level. We measure
take-up by comparing the proportion of simulated benefit receipt with actual benefit
(a) Old Age Benefits
(b) Survivors Benefits
(c) Unemployment Benefits
(d)  Disability Benefits
Figure 4 Calibration shares for benefit disaggregation. Note: The graphics refer to individual benefit
types (a, b, c and d).
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at the level of aggregation in the raw data. Combining all benefits the non-take up rate
is about 5–6 per cent, rising slightly over time. The non-take-up rate is highest
amongst those in receipt of survivor’s benefits and lowest amongst the elderly. To some
Table 5 Non take-up rates by instrument
Take-Up 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Old Age 2.8 2.1 1.7 1.9 2.8 2.7
Unemployment 8.0 9.8 9.5 8.6 7.8 9.1
Survivor 19.0 18.8 19.0 21.4 11.2 9.6
Disability 6.1 6.7 9.1 8.9 7.1 9.5
All 5.2 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.1 6.1
Note: Non take up is modelled at the aggregate benefit level, at the individual unit of analysis.
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ated by construction.
The next point of concern arises from the annual period of analysis. Without any data
on the number of months of benefit receipt, we make the assumption of 12 months
of receipt. In some cases, the amount recorded in the microdata for a particular aggregated
benefit exceeds the maximum amount that can be gained from the instrument. In those
cases, we reallocate the excess amount to other income. This can be the case where,
for example, retirement income or lump sum pensions are recorded as part of old age
benefits. Thus our methodology will tend to over-estimate insurance benefits for
those with alternative income sources. In order to assess the effect of this, we utilised
the equations to predict the likely receipt of disaggregated benefits, then simulated
the value of each benefit and then re-aggregated them again to be able to compare
with the equivalent characteristics in the data.
One source of variation from 12 months is the presence of other sources of income,
particularly for income replacement benefits. In comparing average actual and simulated
benefit data, and in order to avoid this confounding issue, we make our comparison
by excluding those with other sources of labour market income. Figure 5 reports the
ratio of simulated to actual benefit values for this sub-group over time. We note that
for old age and survivor benefits, which are long-term and largely continuous, the
average ratio of simulated to actual is close to one. For more transient instruments0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Old Age Unemployment Survivor Disability
Figure 5 Ratio of average benefit of simulated to actual benefit. Note: For the purpose of this figure,
we assume full-take up in the simulation and consider households with no alternative income sources.
Table 6 Mean equivalised household incomes (actual and simulated)
Market income 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Simulated 20972 21781 22992 24884 23496 21962
Data 20862 21670 22892 24740 23360 21804
Ratio 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
Gross income 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Simulated 25738 26933 28659 31177 30402 29115
Data 24720 25916 27595 29975 28995 27613
Ratio 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
Disposable income 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Simulated 21059 21927 23235 25170 24666 23182
Data 21007 21601 22970 25091 24401 22994
Ratio 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99
Notes:
1. Equivalence scale used is the modified OECD scale.
2. For validation purposes, we have not used weights in this table.
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existence of spells.5. Results: distributional impact of downturn
In this section we report the results of our analysis based upon our model. We
firstly track mean incomes via components market income, gross income (market
plus benefits) and disposable income (gross minus taxes and contributions). We
have deflated by CPI to report the change in purchasing power. In Table 6, we see
that each measure exhibits the same trend, rising to 2007 and then falling to 2009.
We note that average market income is similar in real terms in 2009 to 2005.
However both mean gross income and disposable income are at levels equivalent
to 2006. We note for each measure, the high ratio of actual data to simulated data.
Gross income is slightly lower reflecting issues associated with take-up and issues0.250
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0.280
0.290
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Disposable (Data) Disposable (Sim)
Disposable (Sim Curr TBS) Disposable (Sim Lag TBS)
Figure 6 Distribution of disposable income, simulated and actual. Note: Equivalence scale used is the
modified OECD scale.
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constant over time.Inequality
In Figure 4, we report the trend in the inequality of equivalised household disposable
income over time. We note that inequality fell from 2004 to 2009. Thus the initial
impact of the crisis in 2008 and 2009 was inequality reducing.
We validate the microsimulation model by comparing actual and simulated
Gini’s (Figure 6). The data year’s in the Irish EU-SILC, span 2 years as incomes apply
to the 12 months before the interview date, with interviews conducted more or less
equally across the year. As a result we model the simulated year as the weighted aver-
age of the current and lagged year as a function of the quarter of data collection. We
also report the simulation of tax-benefit systems in the current and lagged year. We
note firstly due to reasons such as benefit non-take up and specification issues in the
simulation of taxation such as the inability to model specific allowances, as well as tax
evasion and avoidance, that there is a gap between the level of the Gini for simulated
and actual equivalised disposable income. This is not surprising and consistent with
other microsimulation analyses. For the period to 2009, there is not much difference in
the trend between the different assumptions, with a correlation of about 0.98. Mean-
while the lagged system has a different trends (rising, but at a lower rate), with a cor-
relation of 0.68, resulting in the weighted average also growing at a relatively lower rate
between the two measures, with a correlation of 0.88. We would therefore conclude
that the current tax-benefit system is a better predictor of trend than the lagged or
weighted average.
We now try to understand the differences in the levels between the actual and
simulated data as a result of the assumptions made. We focus first on the assump-
tions made in relation to the benefits system. We consider three alternatives,
modelling
 Non take-up with the weighted average of current and lagged systems
 Non take-up and an estimate of months of benefit receipt with the weighted aver-
age of current and lagged systems
 Non take-up and an estimate of months of benefit receipt with the current system
We model take-up at the level of the benefit unit level. Take-up regressions are
reported in Appendix 3. The coefficients follow the usual signs, with the higher
the potential benefit receipt, the higher the take-up. Higher other sources of
household income results in lower take-up. Similarly, being in employment in-
creases take-up, while farmers have a lower take-up than other groups. Separated
or divorced are less likely to take-up benefits than other groups. Interestingly,
prior to the boom, those with higher education had a lower propensity to take-
up social benefits, while after the crash, this effect become non-significant.
Modelling benefit non-take-up at the family level, we see that the inequality
trend over time remains the same, with curve shifting about a quarter to a half
of the gap closed. As noted above, part of the reason for the over-simulation of
O’Donoghue et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 18 of 262013, 2:23
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/23benefits, is that it is not possible to identify in the EU-SILC data, receipt of ben-
efits of less than a year. Imputing the number of months received on the basis of
the difference between actual and simulated benefits, we see that much of the
remaining gap is closed in Figure 7. In 2009, this over-compensates pushing in-
equality over 100%. However this is as a result of utilising the weighted average
of the two years. Utilising only the rules of the current year, we see that inequal-
ity tracks but is always lower than the actual data. This is consistent with the
fact that we have not modelled misspecification in modelling taxes and
contributions.
We now consider the impact of misspecification in the modelling of taxes and
contributions. We do this by replacing the simulated value for taxes and contri-
butions with the variable supplied in the data. We note in Figure 8 that prior to
2009, that replacing simulated taxes and contributions (based upon a weighted
average of two years) with the actual value had quite a varied effect, reducing the
gap by between 10% and 50%. This effect is much more consistent however at 30-
40% when one looks at the change in the gap between actual and simulated based
upon the current tax-benefit year. We note however that gap is reduced by a greater
degree by improvements in the benefit assumptions.
Modelling benefit non-take-up at the family level, we see that the inequality
trend over time remains the same, with curve shifting about a quarter to a half
of the gap closed. As noted above, part of the reason for the over-simulation of
benefits, is that it is not possible to identify in the EU-SILC data, receipt of ben-
efits of less than a year. Imputing the number of months received on the basis of
the difference between actual and simulated benefits, we see that much of the
remaining gap is closed in Figure 7. In 2009, this over-compensates pushing in-
equality over 100%. However this is as a result of utilising the weighted average of
the two years. Utilising only the rules of the current year, we see that inequality
tracks but is always lower than the actual data. This is consistent with the fact that
we have not modelled misspecification in modelling taxes and contributions.0.250
0.260
0.270
0.280
0.290
0.300
0.310
0.320
0.330
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Disposable (Data) Disposable (Sim)
Disposable (Sim Ben, Take up) Disposable (Sim Ben, Take up, nMonths) 
Disposable (Sim Ben, Take up, nMonths, Curr) 
Figure 7 Distribution of disposable income, simulated and actual with different benefit
assumptions. Note: Equivalence scale used is the modified OECD scale.
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Figure 8 Distribution of disposable income, simulated and actual with different tax assumptions.
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contributions. We do this by replacing the simulated value for taxes and contri-
butions with the variable supplied in the data. We note in Figure 8 that prior to
2009, that replacing simulated taxes and contributions (based upon a weighted
average of two years) with the actual value had quite a varied effect, reducing the
gap by between 10% and 50%. This effect is much more consistent however at 30-
40% when one looks at the change in the gap between actual and simulated based
upon the current tax-benefit year. We note however that gap is reduced by a greater
degree by improvements in the benefit assumptions.
Market impact
We now try to understand the trend in different components. We firstly focus on
the distribution of market income as measured by the Gini coefficient in Figure 9.
We note in particular that the trend in the distribution of market income (ex-
cluding zero’s) was increasing to 2006, before falling slightly relatively flat in the
period before the crisis. After 2007 market inequality widened firstly quite stead-
ily to the 2009, as the wage rate of some sectors such as industry rose, whileFigure 9 Distribution of market income. Note: Equivalence scale used is the modified OECD scale.
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with the story in Figure 3 above.Redistributive impact
We turn now to the impact on changes to the distribution of income that results from
changes to policy. We measure redistribution relatively simply, comparing the change(a) Benefits
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Figure 10 Redistributive impact. Note: Equivalence scale used is the modified OECD scale. Simulated
Curr reflects the Simulated Value using the Current Year System (a, b and c).
O’Donoghue et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 21 of 262013, 2:23
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/23in the Gini coefficient between market, gross and disposable incomes. We note that
this ignores re-ranking and put off a more detailed examination as to the drivers of
redistribution to further work.
Considering first the impact of benefits, we see in Figure 10a, the steady rise in the
redistributive impact of the benefit system in the period to 2007, driven by the relative
growth in benefits relative to CPI and wage growth during the period. After the onset of
the crisis, the redistributive impact of the benefit system ratcheted up, due to increased
demand. We will consider in further work, the impact of changes to the level of targeting
in the instruments, due to for example changes in the means testing of benefits. As is clear
from analyses of the distribution of disposable income above, assuming full take-up and
receipt for 12 months increases the redistributive effect of the benefit system relative to the
data. We note that there is a relatively difference between the simulated values based
upon a weighted average of two years and those based upon the current system.
The redistributive impact of the tax-system revealed in Figure 10b reveals a similar story
of rising redistribution, very steadily at first and then rising rapidly post 2008 as some of the
tax reforms took hold. We notice a relatively large difference between the weighted average
and the current system. This is due to the changing progressivity of the systems. In general
the redistributive effect of the current system matches that of the data quite well.
Increasing redistribution can be driven by increased progressivity or greater expend-
iture. Table 7 decomposes the redistributive effect into progressivity and rate effects.
To do this we utilise the Kakwani index of progressivity, that measures the difference be-
tween the Lorenz curve and the concentration curve for the relevant instrument. The rate
refers to the instrument as a share of pre-instrument income. Both are expressed as an
index relative to 2004 to highlight the overall trend. In both the case of taxes and benefits,
the progressivity effect has risen over time reflecting the fact that changes to the systems
have been relatively targeted. The effect has been stronger on the benefits side due in part
to the movement from insurance to assistance benefits as the average duration out of work
increased over the crisis. Over the entire period, the rate effect dominates the progressivity
effect, so that the redistributive impact has been driven to a larger extent by demand on
the part of benefits. In the case of taxation, the rate effect actually fell in the middle
part of the period of analysis before rising again with tax and contribution changes in 2009.6. Conclusions
In this paper we attempted to chart the impact of the early part of Ireland’s economic
crisis from 2008–2009 on the distribution of income. In order to decompose the impact
of components of income, we utilised a microsimulation methodology. However the EU-Table 7 Progressivity and rate effects of policy change
Taxes and levies Benefits
Progressivity Rate Progressivity Rate
2004 100 100 100 100
2005 103 98 106 107
2006 109 97 107 115
2007 107 97 108 120
2008 109 98 106 139
2009 105 113 112 168
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purposes due to benefit aggregation, missing information in relation to the length of
benefit receipt and a lack of documentation as to the choices made when producing
the data. For relatively uncomplicated tax-benefit systems in Southern and Eastern
Europe, Figari et al. (2007) adapted the EU-SILC for use in the EUROMOD tax-benefit
framework. However Ireland poses greater challenges. The Irish case is (as is likely the
case in many northern European countries) more complicated. This is due to the fact
that there are more instruments with more complicated rules and with overlapping
values between instruments.
As the microsimulation model can simulate the taxes and contributions contained in
the EU-SILC, the main objective required to make the EU-SILC suitable for microsimu-
lation was to disaggregated the incidence of benefits from 6 variables in the EU-SILC
to 17 disaggregated variables. To do this we estimated a series of equations from an
earlier dataset based upon the European Community Household Panel dataset, together
with official statistics in relation to the number of recipients to simulate the incidence
of the different types of benefits. We also adjusted the number of months of receipt
on the basis of differences between the data and simulated values. Our method also
highlighted a number of data quality issues in relation to the inclusion of some payments
such as redundancy lump sums within social transfer variables. This methodology is
potentially applicable to other countries too and thus could be utilised to develop the
EU-SILC for microsimulation purposes.
We undertook a detailed validation of the methodology, finding that the methodology
was reasonably effective, subject to the usual consequences of assumptions using
microsimulation such as 100% benefit take-up and under-estimating the impact of
non-modelable allowances, full year of receipt for benefits and tax avoidance/evasion in
tax system. Overall we found that the simulated and data based approaches generated a
similar trend, albeit with lower levels of inequality for these reasons. Modelling benefit
take-up, and partial year receipt, we were able to bridge much of the gap between the two
approaches, giving us confidence in our methodology.
We utilised the framework to model changes to the level of income inequality from
the period just before the crisis in 2004 to after the crisis in 2009. In terms of the impact
of the economic crisis, we found that the income inequality fell in the early part of the
crisis. Much of this change was due to rising inequality of market incomes, (even when
discounting unemployment). This was due to the differential effect of the downturn
on different sectors where some sectors such as the construction and public sectors
were significantly hit, while the international traded sectors have been relatively immune
from the downturn and have seen continued growth. The impact of the tax-benefit system
has been to mitigate this upward pressure, with a gradual rise in the redistributive effect
of the tax-benefit system driven by an increase in demand primarily on the benefits side
and increased progressivity.Endnotes
1 See EUROSTAT, GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) 1997–2008.
2 For a broad description of the structure of the Irish tax-benefit system, see
O’Donoghue (2004).
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4 According to the CSO, in 2010 changes had been made to the processing of the
data which resulted in an incorrect treatment in some cases of tax, income and pension
contributions. This became clear when unusual trends in certain categories between
2010 and 2011 were further analysed.Table 8 Structure of reforms 2008-2013
Year Main structural changes
2008 Increase in social welfare payments above CPI
Increases in limits for mortgage interest
2009 Introduction of a Pension Levy for Public Servants
Social Welfare rates increased (ahead of CPI)
Halving of Child Care Supplement
Introduction of an income levy
Increase in the standard rate bands
Minor Adjustments to mortgage interest relief
2009 Suppl. Reduction in Social Welfare rates for the young unemployed
Reduction in the duration of mortgage interest to 7 years
Doubling rates of income levy and adjust bands
Doubling rates of health levy and adjust bands
Raise PRSI ceiling
2010 Cessation of the Child Care Supplement
Reduction in Child Benefits
Reduction of Public Servant Pay
Reduction in working age social welfare benefits
2011 Second homes tax Reduction in Child Benefits
Reduction in working age social welfare benefits
Reduction in pay of new entrants to the public service
Reduction in public service pensions
Replacement of income and health levy with the Universal Social Charge,
which has a broader base
Reduction of bands and credits by 10%
Removal of ceiling for PRSI for contributions
Restriction of relief for PRSI for pension contributions
2011 Jobs initiative Reduced Employer’s PRSI
2012 Change to Mortgage Interest Relief deduction rate
Change to the exemption level for the Universal Social Charge
Introduction of a Household Charge (Flat rate property tax)
Changes to rates of child benefit
Ending of lone parent half payment for period of entry to labour market
2013 Reduction in Child Benefits
Household Property Tax
Some Changes to Benefits
Appendix 1
Structure of tax-benefit reforms (Table 8).
Table 9 Mapping of benefit variables
Social protection benefit No. of Recipients
(2010) – 1000’s
Modelled benefit EU-SILC benefit
State pension (Contributory) 280.4 State pension (Contributory &
transitory)
Old age benefits
State pension (Transitory) 10.2
State pension (Non-contributory) 97.2 State pension (Non-contributory)
Widow(er)’s contributory
pension
114.6 Widow(er)’s contributory pension Survivor’s benefits
Widow(er)’s non-contributory
pension
2.0 Widow(er)’s non-contributory
pension
Deserted wife’s benefit 8.4 Deserted wife’s benefit/allowance Family benefits
Deserted wife’s allowance 0.5
One parent family allowance 92.3 One parent family allowance
Maternity benefit 23.5 Maternity benefit
Child benefit 591.4 Child benefit
Other child related benefits 1.5 n/a
Family income supplement 28.2 Family income supplement
Illness benefit 81.3 Illness benefit Sickness benefits
Invalidity pension 50.8 Invalidity pension Disability benefits
Blind pension 1.5
Injury benefit 0.8
Disablement pension 13.7
Disability allowance 101.1 Disability allowance
Carer’s benefit 1.6 Carer’s benefit/allowance
Carer’s allowance 50.6
Other illness benefits 0.9 n/a
Jobseeker’s benefit 123.5 Jobseeker’s benefit Unemployment
benefits
Jobseekers’s allowance 261.9 Jobseeker’s allowance
Farm assist 10.7
Supplementary welfare
allowance
37.4
Pre-retirement allowance 6.0 Pre-retirement allowance
Back to work allowances 9.0 Back to work/education
Allowances
Back to education allowance 21.1
Source: Department of Social Protection Social Welfare Statistics 2010.
Appendix 2
Mapping of benefit variables (Table 9).
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Table 10 Logit models of benefit take-up
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Age 0.015* 0.002 0.0082 0.0162** 0.0148** 0.0167**
Non benefit household income −0.3785*** −0.3632*** −0.4472*** −0.4395*** −0.324*** −0.2037**
Simulated receipt of unemployment
benefits
0.1179 −0.626** −0.8447*** −0.6446** 0.5667** 0.1518
Simulated receipt of survivor benefits −1.4418*** −2.3788*** −1.9545*** −2.0104*** −0.3928 −0.7043*
Simulated receipt of
disability benefits
0.2387 −0.324 −1.0189*** −1.0238*** 0.2256 −0.0124
Total simulated benefit receipt 0 0.00004 0.0001*** 0.00009*** 0.0001*** 0.00002
In employment 0.5753** 0.6855*** 0.8319*** 0.4305* 0.4588** 0.4428*
Is a farmer −0.5086 −0.6533 −0.4308 −0.3645 −0.8272** −1.2007***
Retired 0.8546*** 0.4189 0.1007 0.1221 0.5052* 0.6225**
Married 0.1346 0.6812*** 1.1447*** 0.5571* 0.4651* 0.1549
Widowed −0.2407 0.6187* −0.3704 −0.6617* −0.0464 −0.0883
Separated or divorced −1.0764*** −0.4815 −0.9053*** −1.0323*** −1.069*** −0.7219**
Number of children aged 0-11 −0.398 −0.466** −0.106 −0.2375 0.5033 −0.0403
Number of children aged 12-15 0.2507 −0.2266 0.0605 0.0653 −0.3472* −0.2155
Suburban 0.0772 −0.2786 −0.4095* −0.3254 −0.1127 0.1652
Rural −0.347* −0.3389* −0.3571* −0.3427 −0.3345* −0.0658
University educated −0.561** −0.4588* −0.5654** 0.1587 −0.5162** 0.0084
Upper secondary educated −0.5145** −0.3738* −0.5526*** −0.5288*** 0.1078 −0.0244
Constant 2.5637*** 3.3866*** 3.18*** 2.8931*** 1.6974*** 1.8536***
N 3446 3938 3773 3768 3834 3746
Pseudo R2 0.0967 0.1201 0.1542 0.1625 0.0789 0.0585
Source: Sologon and O’Donoghue (2013).
* significant at 10%.
** significant at 5%.
*** significant at 1%.
Appendix 3
Logit models of benefit take-up (Table 10).
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At the aggregate level, our model performs relatively well for an analysis of simulated total
benefits. Given the aggregation of the benefits in the SILC and the room for measurement
and reporting error in the data collection in terms of the classification of benefits received, we
have grouped benefits into categories for comparison. We find that overall we over estimate
total benefit expenditure in our model in 2004 relative to the official statistics for 2004 by
about 8%. This is consistent with an assumption of full-take up of benefits. We under-report
unemployment receipts which is consistent with the results in Table 10 that the uncalibrated
SILC data has a lower unemployment rate than that of external control totals (Table 11).Table 11 Comparing simulated benefits with official statistics (2004 - €m)
Official statistics (2004) Simulated Ratio
Old age & survivors 3663 4195 114.5
Unemployment 1832 1505 82.1
Family 2516 2781 110.5
Sickness and disability 1812 2128 117.4
Total 9823 10609 108.0
O’Donoghue et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 26 of 262013, 2:23
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/23Competing interests
The IZA Journal of European Labor Studies is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.
The authors declare that they have observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for helpful comments provided at the IZA-OECD conference in Paris and from an
anonymous referee.
Responsible editor: Alan Barrett
Author details
1Teagasc Rural Economy and Development Programme, Teagasc Mellows Campus, Athenry, Ireland. 2University of
Liverpool, Liverpool, UK.
Received: 30 May 2013 Revised: 24 September 2013 Accepted: 26 November 2013
Published:
References
23 Dec 2013Callan T, Keane C (2009) Non-cash benefits and the distribution of economic welfare. Econ Soc Rev 40(1):49–71,
Economic and Social Studies
Callan T, Nolan B (2010) Inequality and the crisis: the distributional impact of tax increases and welfare and public
sector pay cuts. Econ Soc Rev 41(4):461–471
Callan T, O’Donoghue C, O’Neill C (1994) Analysis of basic income schemes for Ireland. ESRI Policy Research Series
Paper No, Dublin, p 21
Callan T, Keeney MJ, Nolan B, Walsh JR (2001) Reforming tax and welfare ESRI policy research series 42. Economic and
Social Research Institute, Dublin
Callan T, Keane C, Walsh JR, Lane M (2010a) From Data to Policy Analysis: Tax-Benefit Modelling using SILC 2008. J Stat
Soc Inq Soc Ireland, Vol. XL
Callan T, Nolan B, Keane C, Walsh JR (2010b) Inequality and the Crisis: The Distributional Impact of Tax Increases and
Welfare and Public Sector Pay Cuts. The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies 41(4):461–471
Callan T, Nolan B, Walsh J (2011) The economic crisis, public sector pay and the income distribution (Vol. 32, pp. 207-
225). Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Callan T, Keane C, Savage M, Walsh JR (2012) Distributional impact of tax, welfare and public sector pay policies:
2009-2012. Quarterly Economic Commentary 2012, 45-56. ESRI, Dublin
Decoster A, Loughrey J, O’Donoghue C, Verwerft D (2010) How regressive are indirect taxes? A microsimulation analysis
for five European countries. J Policy Anal Manage 29(2):326–350
Figari F, Horacio L, Holly S (2007) Using the EU-SILC for policy simulation: prospects, some limitations and suggestions.
EUROMOD Working Paper No EM1/07
Levy H, Mercader-Prats M (2003) EUROMOD Country Report SPAIN. https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/msu/emod/
documentation/countries/spain/crsp0701.pdf
Loughrey J, O’Donoghue C (2012) The welfare impact of price changes on household welfare and inequality
1999–2011. Econ Soc Rev 43(1):31–66
Machado J, Mata J (2005) Counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage distributions using quantile regression.
J Appl Econ 20:445–465
O’Donoghue C (2004) Redistributive forces in the Irish tax-benefit system. Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry
Society of Ireland. Dublin, Vol. XXXII, 2002/2003:33–69.
O’Donoghue C, Loughrey J (2013) Analysis on the existing national and cross national experience on microsimulation
of social indicators of income and poverty. Mimeo Report to Eurostat
O’Riain S (2012) The crisis of financialisation in Ireland. Econ Soc Rev 43(4):497–533
Voitchovsky S, Maitre B, Nolan B (2012) Wage inequality in Ireland’s “Celtic tiger” boom. Econ Soc Rev 43(1):99–133
Whelan K (2010) Policy lessons from Ireland’s latest depression. Econ Soc Rev 41(2):225–254Cite this article as: O’Donoghue et al.: Using the EU-SILC to model the impact of the economic crisis on
inequality. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
10.1186/2193-9012-2-23
2013, 2:23
